the cause of a second sin, in the
same way, yet another sin will be the cause of the first, and thus we
go on indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore one sin is not the
cause of another.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory says on Ezechiel (Hom. xi): "A sin that is
not quickly blotted out by repentance, is both a sin and a cause of
sin."
_I answer that,_ Forasmuch as a sin has a cause on the part of the
act of sin, it is possible for one sin to be the cause of another, in
the same way as one human act is the cause of another. Hence it
happens that one sin may be the cause of another in respect of the
four kinds of causes. First, after the manner of an efficient or
moving cause, both directly and indirectly. Indirectly, as that which
removes an impediment is called an indirect cause of movement: for
when man, by one sinful act, loses grace, or charity, or shame, or
anything else that withdraws him from sin, he thereby falls into
another sin, so that the first sin is the accidental cause of the
second. Directly, as when, by one sinful act, man is disposed to
commit more readily another like act: because acts cause dispositions
and habits inclining to like acts. Secondly, after the manner of a
material cause, one sin is the cause of another, by preparing its
matter: thus covetousness prepares the matter for strife, which is
often about the wealth a man has amassed together. Thirdly, after the
manner of a final cause, one sin causes another, in so far as a man
commits one sin for the sake of another which is his end; as when a
man is guilty of simony for the end of ambition, or fornication for
the purpose of theft. And since the end gives the form to moral
matters, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, AA. 4, 6), it follows
that one sin is also the formal cause of another: because in the act
of fornication committed for the purpose of theft, the former is
material while the latter is formal.
Reply Obj. 1: Sin, in so far as it is inordinate, has the character
of evil; but, in so far as it is an act, it has some good, at least
apparent, for its end: so that, as an act, but not as being
inordinate, it can be the cause, both final and efficient, of another
sin. A sin has matter, not _of which_ but _about which_ it is: and it
has its form from its end. Consequently one sin can be the cause of
another, in respect of the four kinds of cause, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: Sin is something imperfect on account of its moral
imperfe
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