ording to the Divine
law, whether or not it advert to the eternal law. For if it thinks of
God's law, it holds it in actual contempt: and if not, it neglects it
by a kind of omission. Therefore the consent to a sinful act always
proceeds from the higher reason: because, as Augustine says (De Trin.
xii, 12), "the mind cannot effectively decide on the commission of a
sin, unless by its consent, whereby it wields its sovereign power of
moving the members to action, or of restraining them from action, it
become the servant or slave of the evil deed."

Reply Obj. 3: The higher reason, by considering the eternal law, can
direct or restrain the internal delectation, even as it can direct or
restrain the external action: nevertheless, before the judgment of
the higher reason is pronounced the lower reason, while deliberating
the matter in reference to temporal principles, sometimes approves of
this delectation: and then the consent to the delectation belongs to
the lower reason. If, however, after considering the eternal law, man
persists in giving the same consent, such consent will then belong to
the higher reason.

Reply Obj. 4: The apprehension of the power of imagination is sudden
and indeliberate: wherefore it can cause an act before the higher or
lower reason has time to deliberate. But the judgment of the lower
reason is deliberate, and so requires time, during which the higher
reason can also deliberate; consequently, if by its deliberation it
does not check the sinful act, this will deservedly be imputed to it.
________________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 8]

Whether Consent to Delectation Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that consent to delectation is not a
mortal sin, for consent to delectation belongs to the lower reason,
which does not consider the eternal types, i.e. the eternal law, and
consequently does not turn away from them. Now every mortal sin
consists in turning away from the Divine law, as is evident from
Augustine's definition of mortal sin, which was quoted above (Q. 71,
A. 6). Therefore consent to delectation is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, consent to a thing is not evil, unless the thing to
which consent is given be evil. Now "the cause of anything being such
is yet more so," or at any rate not less. Consequently the thing to
which a man consents cannot be a lesser evil than his consent. But
delectation without deed is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin.