delectation about sensible objects comes also under the direction of
reason.
Reply Obj. 3: Delectation is said to be morose not from a delay of
time, but because the reason in deliberating dwells (_immoratur_)
thereon, and fails to drive it away, "deliberately holding and
turning over what should have been cast aside as soon as it touched
the mind," as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12).
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 7]
Whether the Sin of Consent to the Act Is in the Higher Reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not
in the higher reason. For consent is an act of the appetitive power,
as stated above (Q. 15, A. 1): whereas the reason is an apprehensive
power. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher
reason.
Obj. 2: Further, "the higher reason is intent on contemplating and
consulting the eternal law," as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7).
[*_Rationes aeternae,_ cf. I, Q. 15, AA. 2, 3, where as in similar
passages _ratio_ has been rendered by the English _type,_ because St.
Thomas was speaking of the Divine _idea_ as the archetype of the
creature. Hence the type or idea is a rule of conduct, and is
identified with the eternal law, (cf. A. 8, Obj. 1; A. 9)]. But
sometimes consent is given to an act, without consulting the eternal
law: since man does not always think about Divine things, whenever he
consents to an act. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not
always in the higher reason.
Obj. 3: Further, just as man can regulate his external actions
according to the eternal law, so can he regulate his internal
pleasures or other passions. But "consent to a pleasure without
deciding to fulfil it by deed, belongs to the lower reason," as
Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 2). Therefore the consent to a sinful
act should also be sometimes ascribed to the lower reason.
Obj. 4: Further, just as the higher reason excels the lower, so does
the reason excel the imagination. Now sometimes man proceeds to act
through the apprehension of the power of imagination, without any
deliberation of his reason, as when, without premeditation, he moves
his hand, or foot. Therefore sometimes also the lower reason may
consent to a sinful act, independently of the higher reason.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "If the consent
to the evil use of things that can be perceived by the bodily senses,
so far approves of any si
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