of its causing more harm.

Obj. 2: Further, harm is inflicted by sins against our neighbor.
Because no one wishes to harm himself: and no one can harm God,
according to Job 35:6, 8: "If thy iniquities be multiplied, what
shalt thou do against Him? . . . Thy wickedness may hurt a man that
is like thee." If, therefore, sins were aggravated through causing
more harm, it would follow that sins against our neighbor are more
grievous than sins against God or oneself.

Obj. 3: Further, greater harm is inflicted on a man by depriving him
of the life of grace, than by taking away his natural life; because
the life of grace is better than the life of nature, so far that man
ought to despise his natural life lest he lose the life of grace.
Now, speaking absolutely, a man who leads a woman to commit
fornication deprives her of the life of grace by leading her into
mortal sin. If therefore a sin were more grievous on account of its
causing a greater harm, it would follow that fornication, absolutely
speaking, is a more grievous sin than murder, which is evidently
untrue. Therefore a sin is not more grievous on account of its
causing a greater harm.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14): "Since vice
is contrary to nature, a vice is the more grievous according as it
diminishes the integrity of nature." Now the diminution of the
integrity of nature is a harm. Therefore a sin is graver according as
it does more harm.

_I answer that,_ Harm may bear a threefold relation to sin. Because
sometimes the harm resulting from a sin is foreseen and intended, as
when a man does something with a mind to harm another, e.g. a
murderer or a thief. In this case the quantity of harm aggravates the
sin directly, because then the harm is the direct object of the sin.
Sometimes the harm is foreseen, but not intended; for instance, when
a man takes a short cut through a field, the result being that he
knowingly injures the growing crops, although his intention is not to
do this harm, but to commit fornication. In this case again the
quantity of the harm done aggravates the sin; indirectly, however, in
so far, to wit, as it is owing to his will being strongly inclined to
sin, that a man does not forbear from doing, to himself or to
another, a harm which he would not wish simply. Sometimes, however,
the harm is neither foreseen nor intended: and then if this harm is
connected with the sin accidentally, it does not aggravate the sin