asty medicine, nowise for its own
sake, but only for the sake of something else. Accordingly we must
say that man must delight in God for His own sake, as being his last
end, and in virtuous deeds, not as being his end, but for the sake of
their inherent goodness which is delightful to the virtuous. Hence
Ambrose says (De Parad. xiii) that virtuous deeds are called fruits
because "they refresh those that have them, with a holy and genuine
delight."
Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes the names of the virtues are applied to their
actions: thus Augustine writes (Tract. xl in Joan.): "Faith is to
believe what thou seest not"; and (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10):
"Charity is the movement of the soul in loving God and our neighbor."
It is thus that the names of the virtues are used in reckoning the
fruits.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 70, Art. 2]
Whether the Fruits Differ from the Beatitudes?
Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits do not differ from the
beatitudes. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated
above (Q. 69, A. 1, ad 1). But the gifts perfect man in so far as he
is moved by the Holy Ghost. Therefore the beatitudes themselves are
fruits of the Holy Ghost.
Obj. 2: Further, as the fruit of eternal life is to future beatitude
which is that of actual possession, so are the fruits of the present
life to the beatitudes of the present life, which are based on hope.
Now the fruit of eternal life is identified with future beatitude.
Therefore the fruits of the present life are the beatitudes.
Obj. 3: Further, fruit is essentially something ultimate and
delightful. Now this is the very nature of beatitude, as stated above
(Q. 3, A. 1; Q. 4, A. 1). Therefore fruit and beatitude have the same
nature, and consequently should not be distinguished from one another.
_On the contrary,_ Things divided into different species, differ from
one another. But fruits and beatitudes are divided into different
parts, as is clear from the way in which they are enumerated.
Therefore the fruits differ from the beatitudes.
_I answer that,_ More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit.
Because it is sufficient for a fruit to be something ultimate and
delightful; whereas for a beatitude, it must be something perfect and
excellent. Hence all the beatitudes may be called fruits, but not
vice versa. For the fruits are any virtuous deeds in which one
delights: whereas the beatitudes are none but perfect
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