l sins;

(3) Whether sins differ in reference to their causes?

(4) Whether they differ with respect to those who are sinned against?

(5) Whether sins differ in relation to the debt of punishment?

(6) Whether they differ in regard to omission and commission?

(7) Whether they differ according to their various stages?

(8) Whether they differ in respect of excess and deficiency?

(9) Whether they differ according to their various circumstances?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 1]

Whether Sins Differ in Species According to Their Objects?

Objection 1: It would seem that sins do not differ in species,
according to their objects. For acts are said to be good or evil, in
relation, chiefly, to their end, as shown above (Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18,
AA. 4, 6). Since then sin is nothing else than a bad human act, as
stated above (Q. 71, A. 1), it seems that sins should differ
specifically according to their ends rather than according to their
objects.

Obj. 2: Further, evil, being a privation, differs specifically
according to the different species of opposites. Now sin is an evil
in the genus of human acts. Therefore sins differ specifically
according to their opposites rather than according to their objects.

Obj. 3: Further, if sins differed specifically according to their
objects, it would be impossible to find the same specific sin with
diverse objects: and yet such sins are to be found. For pride is
about things spiritual and material as Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv,
18); and avarice is about different kinds of things. Therefore sins
do not differ in species according to their objects.

_On the contrary,_ "Sin is a word, deed, or desire against God's
law." Now words, deeds, and desires differ in species according to
their various objects: since acts differ by their objects, as stated
above (Q. 18, A. 2). Therefore sins, also differ in species according
to their objects.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 71, A. 6), two things concur in
the nature of sin, viz. the voluntary act, and its inordinateness,
which consists in departing from God's law. Of these two, one is
referred essentially to the sinner, who intends such and such an act
in such and such matter; while the other, viz. the inordinateness of
the act, is referred accidentally to the intention of the sinner, for
"no one acts intending evil," as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv).
Now it is evident that a thing derives its specie