tural temperament or by being
accustomed, are prompt in doing deeds of liberality, but are not
prompt in doing deeds of chastity.
But the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to do a good
deed well; and if we take moral virtues in this way, we must say that
they are connected, as nearly as all are agreed in saying. For this
two reasons are given, corresponding to the different ways of
assigning the distinction of the cardinal virtues. For, as we stated
above (Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), some distinguish them according to certain
general properties of the virtues: for instance, by saying that
discretion belongs to prudence, rectitude to justice, moderation to
temperance, and strength of mind to fortitude, in whatever matter we
consider these properties to be. In this way the reason for the
connection is evident: for strength of mind is not commended as
virtuous, if it be without moderation or rectitude or discretion: and
so forth. This, too, is the reason assigned for the connection by
Gregory, who says (Moral. xxii, 1) that "a virtue cannot be perfect"
as a virtue, "if isolated from the others: for there can be no true
prudence without temperance, justice and fortitude": and he continues
to speak in like manner of the other virtues (cf. Q. 61, A. 4, Obj.
1). Augustine also gives the same reason (De Trin. vi, 4).
Others, however, differentiate these virtues in respect of their
matters, and it is in this way that Aristotle assigns the reason for
their connection (Ethic. vi, 13). Because, as stated above (Q. 58, A.
4), no moral virtue can be without prudence; since it is proper to
moral virtue to make a right choice, for it is an elective habit. Now
right choice requires not only the inclination to a due end, which
inclination is the direct outcome of moral virtue, but also correct
choice of things conducive to the end, which choice is made by
prudence, that counsels, judges, and commands in those things that
are directed to the end. In like manner one cannot have prudence
unless one has the moral virtues: since prudence is "right reason
about things to be done," and the starting point of reason is the end
of the thing to be done, to which end man is rightly disposed by
moral virtue. Hence, just as we cannot have speculative science
unless we have the understanding of the principles, so neither can we
have prudence without the moral virtues: and from this it follows
clearly that the moral virtues are connected with o
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