he active life pass away from the
body." Therefore moral virtues do not remain after this life.

Obj. 3: Further, temperance and fortitude, which are moral virtues,
are in the irrational parts of the soul, as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. iii, 10). Now the irrational parts of the soul are corrupted,
when the body is corrupted: since they are acts of bodily organs.
Therefore it seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this
life.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 1:15) that "justice is
perpetual and immortal."

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), Cicero held
that the cardinal virtues do not remain after this life; and that, as
Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), "in the other life men are made
happy by the mere knowledge of that nature, than which nothing is
better or more lovable, that Nature, to wit, which created all
others." Afterwards he concludes that these four virtues remain in
the future life, but after a different manner.

In order to make this evident, we must note that in these virtues
there is a formal element, and a quasi-material element. The material
element in these virtues is a certain inclination of the appetitive
part to the passions and operations according to a certain mode: and
since this mode is fixed by reason, the formal element is precisely
this order of reason.

Accordingly we must say that these moral virtues do not remain in the
future life, as regards their material element. For in the future
life there will be no concupiscences and pleasures in matters of food
and sex; nor fear and daring about dangers of death; nor
distributions and commutations of things employed in this present
life. But, as regards the formal element, they will remain most
perfect, after this life, in the Blessed, in as much as each one's
reason will have most perfect rectitude in regard to things
concerning him in respect of that state of life: and his appetitive
power will be moved entirely according to the order of reason, in
things pertaining to that same state. Hence Augustine says (De Trin.
xiv, 9) that "prudence will be there without any danger of error;
fortitude, without the anxiety of bearing with evil; temperance,
without the rebellion of the desires: so that prudence will neither
prefer nor equal any good to God; fortitude will adhere to Him most
steadfastly; and temperance will delight in Him Who knows no
imperfection." As to justice, it is yet more evident what will be