the seven virtues, commonly so called. Therefore the gifts
do not differ from the virtues commonly so called.
Obj. 3: Further, things whose definitions are the same, are
themselves the same. But the definition of virtue applies to the
gifts; for each gift is "a good quality of the mind, whereby we lead
a good life," etc. [*Cf. Q. 55, A. 4]. Likewise the definition of a
gift can apply to the infused virtues: for a gift is "an unreturnable
giving," according to the Philosopher (Topic. iv, 4). Therefore the
virtues and gifts do not differ from one another.
Obj. 4: Several of the things mentioned among the gifts, are virtues:
for, as stated above (Q. 57, A. 2), wisdom, understanding, and
knowledge are intellectual virtues, counsel pertains to prudence,
piety to a kind of justice, and fortitude is a moral virtue.
Therefore it seems that the gifts do not differ from the virtues.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. i, 12) distinguishes seven gifts,
which he states to be denoted by the seven sons of Job, from the
three theological virtues, which, he says, are signified by Job's
three daughters. He also distinguishes (Moral. ii, 26) the same seven
gifts from the four cardinal virtues, which he says were signified by
the four corners of the house.
_I answer that,_ If we speak of gift and virtue with regard to the
notion conveyed by the words themselves, there is no opposition
between them. Because the word "virtue" conveys the notion that it
perfects man in relation to well-doing, while the word "gift" refers
to the cause from which it proceeds. Now there is no reason why that
which proceeds from one as a gift should not perfect another in
well-doing: especially as we have already stated (Q. 63, A. 3) that
some virtues are infused into us by God. Wherefore in this respect we
cannot differentiate gifts from virtues. Consequently some have held
that the gifts are not to be distinguished from the virtues. But
there remains no less a difficulty for them to solve; for they must
explain why some virtues are called gifts and some not; and why among
the gifts there are some, fear, for instance, that are not reckoned
virtues.
Hence it is that others have said that the gifts should be held as
being distinct from the virtues; yet they have not assigned a
suitable reason for this distinction, a reason, to wit, which would
apply either to all the virtues, and to none of the gifts, or vice
versa. For, seeing that of the seven gifts,
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