intellectual virtue. Moreover, something is included corresponding to
justice, viz. piety, and something corresponding to fortitude, viz.
the gift of fortitude; while there is nothing to correspond to
temperance. Therefore the gifts are enumerated insufficiently.

Obj. 2: Further, piety is a part of justice. But no part of fortitude
is assigned to correspond thereto, but fortitude itself. Therefore
justice itself, and not piety, ought to have been set down.

Obj. 3: Further, the theological virtues, more than any, direct us to
God. Since, then, the gifts perfect man according as he is moved by
God, it seems that some gifts, corresponding to the theological
virtues, should have been included.

Obj. 4: Further, even as God is an object of fear, so is He of love,
of hope, and of joy. Now love, hope, and joy are passions condivided
with fear. Therefore, as fear is set down as a gift, so ought the
other three.

Obj. 5: Further, wisdom is added in order to direct understanding;
counsel, to direct fortitude; knowledge, to direct piety. Therefore,
some gift should have been added for the purpose of directing fear.
Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated.

_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Holy Writ (Isa. 11:2, 3).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), the gifts are habits
perfecting man so that he is ready to follow the promptings of the
Holy Ghost, even as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive powers
so that they obey the reason. Now just as it is natural for the
appetitive powers to be moved by the command of reason, so it is
natural for all the forces in man to be moved by the instinct of God,
as by a superior power. Therefore whatever powers in man can be the
principles of human actions, can also be the subjects of gifts, even
as they are virtues; and such powers are the reason and appetite.

Now the reason is speculative and practical: and in both we find the
apprehension of truth (which pertains to the discovery of truth), and
judgment concerning the truth. Accordingly, for the apprehension of
truth, the speculative reason is perfected by _understanding;_ the
practical reason, by _counsel._ In order to judge aright, the
speculative reason is perfected by _wisdom_; the practical reason by
_knowledge._ The appetitive power, in matters touching a man's
relations to another, is perfected by _piety;_ in matters touching
himself, it is perfected by _fortitude_ against the f