rtion, in so far as their
growth in man is equal: thus the fingers are unequal in size, but
equal in proportion, since they grow in proportion to one another.

Now the nature of this equality is to be explained in the same way as
the connection of virtues; for equality among virtues is their
connection as to greatness. Now it has been stated above (Q. 65, A.
1) that a twofold connection of virtues may be assigned. The first is
according to the opinion of those who understood these four virtues
to be four general properties of virtues, each of which is found
together with the other in any matter. In this way virtues cannot be
said to be equal in any matter unless they have all these properties
equal. Augustine alludes to this kind of equality (De Trin. vi, 4)
when he says: "If you say these men are equal in fortitude, but that
one is more prudent than the other; it follows that the fortitude of
the latter is less prudent. Consequently they are not really equal in
fortitude, since the former's fortitude is more prudent. You will
find that this applies to the other virtues if you run over them all
in the same way."

The other kind of connection among virtues followed the opinion of
those who hold these virtues to have their own proper respective
matters (Q. 65, AA. 1, 2). In this way the connection among moral
virtues results from prudence, and, as to the infused virtues, from
charity, and not from the inclination, which is on the part of the
subject, as stated above (Q. 65, A. 1). Accordingly the nature of the
equality among virtues can also be considered on the part of
prudence, in regard to that which is formal in all the moral virtues:
for in one and the same man, so long as his reason has the same
degree of perfection, the mean will be proportionately defined
according to right reason in each matter of virtue.

But in regard to that which is material in the moral virtues, viz.
the inclination to the virtuous act, one may be readier to perform
the act of one virtue, than the act of another virtue, and this
either from nature, or from habituation, or again by the grace of God.

Reply Obj. 1: This saying of the Apostle may be taken to refer to the
gifts of gratuitous grace, which are not common to all, nor are all
of them equal in the one same subject. We might also say that it
refers to the measure of sanctifying grace, by reason of which one
man has all the virtues in greater abundance than another man, on
account