hing to
that which is best," as stated in _Phys._ vii, text. 17. Now prudence
is "right reason about things to be done," whereby man is brought to
happiness: whereas wisdom takes no notice of human acts, whereby man
attains happiness. Therefore prudence is a greater virtue than wisdom.

Obj. 3: Further, the more perfect knowledge is, the greater it seems
to be. Now we can have more perfect knowledge of human affairs, which
are the subject of science, than of Divine things, which are the
object of wisdom, which is the distinction given by Augustine (De
Trin. xii, 14): because Divine things are incomprehensible, according
to Job 26:26: "Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge."
Therefore science is a greater virtue than wisdom.

Obj. 4: Further, knowledge of principles is more excellent than
knowledge of conclusions. But wisdom draws conclusions from
indemonstrable principles which are the object of the virtue of
understanding, even as other sciences do. Therefore understanding is
a greater virtue than wisdom.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that wisdom is
"the head" among "the intellectual virtues."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), the greatness of a virtue,
as to its species, is taken from its object. Now the object of wisdom
surpasses the objects of all the intellectual virtues: because wisdom
considers the Supreme Cause, which is God, as stated at the beginning
of the _Metaphysics._ And since it is by the cause that we judge of
an effect, and by the higher cause that we judge of the lower
effects; hence it is that wisdom exercises judgment over all the
other intellectual virtues, directs them all, and is the architect of
them all.

Reply Obj. 1: Since prudence is about human affairs, and wisdom about
the Supreme Cause, it is impossible for prudence to be a greater
virtue than wisdom, "unless," as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 7, "man were
the greatest thing in the world." Wherefore we must say, as stated in
the same book (Ethic. vi), that prudence does not command wisdom, but
vice versa: because "the spiritual man judgeth all things; and he
himself is judged by no man" (1 Cor. 2:15). For prudence has no
business with supreme matters which are the object of wisdom: but its
command covers things directed to wisdom, viz. how men are to obtain
wisdom. Wherefore prudence, or political science, is, in this way,
the servant of wisdom; for it leads to wisdom, preparing the way for
her, as