to be greater relatively, by reason of its helping
or adorning a principal virtue: even as substance is more excellent
simply than accident: and yet relatively some particular accident is
more excellent than substance in so far as it perfects substance in
some accidental mode of being.

Reply Obj. 1: The act of liberality needs to be founded on an act of
justice, for "a man is not liberal in giving, unless he gives of his
own" (Polit. ii, 3). Hence there could be no liberality apart from
justice, which discerns between "meum" and "tuum": whereas justice
can be without liberality. Hence justice is simply greater than
liberality, as being more universal, and as being its foundation:
while liberality is greater relatively since it is an ornament and an
addition to justice.

Reply Obj. 2: Patience is said to have "a perfect work," by enduring
evils, wherein it excludes not only unjust revenge, which is also
excluded by justice; not only hatred, which is also suppressed by
charity; nor only anger, which is calmed by gentleness; but also
inordinate sorrow, which is the root of all the above. Wherefore it
is more perfect and excellent through plucking up the root in this
matter. It is not, however, more perfect than all the other virtues
simply. Because fortitude not only endures trouble without being
disturbed, but also fights against it if necessary. Hence whoever is
brave is patient; but the converse does not hold, for patience is a
part of fortitude.

Reply Obj. 3: There can be no magnanimity without the other virtues,
as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 3. Hence it is compared to them as their
ornament, so that relatively it is greater than all the others, but
not simply.
________________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 5]

Whether Wisdom Is the Greatest of the Intellectual Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not the greatest of the
intellectual virtues. Because the commander is greater than the one
commanded. Now prudence seems to command wisdom, for it is stated in
_Ethic._ i, 2 that political science, which belongs to prudence
(Ethic. vi, 8), "orders that sciences should be cultivated in states,
and to which of these each individual should devote himself, and to
what extent." Since, then, wisdom is one of the sciences, it seems
that prudence is greater than wisdom.

Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to the nature of virtue to direct man to
happiness: because virtue is "the disposition of a perfect t