gs to liberality, the latter to justice.
Therefore liberality is apparently a greater virtue than justice.
Obj. 2: Further, the chief quality of a thing is, seemingly, that in
which it is most perfect. Now, according to Jam. 1:4, "Patience hath
a perfect work." Therefore it would seem that patience is greater
than justice.
Obj. 3: Further, "Magnanimity has a great influence on every virtue,"
as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 3. Therefore it magnifies even justice.
Therefore it is greater than justice.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice
is the most excellent of the virtues."
_I answer that,_ A virtue considered in its species may be greater or
less, either simply or relatively. A virtue is said to be greater
simply, whereby a greater rational good shines forth, as stated above
(A. 1). In this way justice is the most excellent of all the moral
virtues, as being most akin to reason. This is made evident by
considering its subject and its object: its subject, because this is
the will, and the will is the rational appetite, as stated above (Q.
8, A. 1; Q. 26, A. 1): its object or matter, because it is about
operations, whereby man is set in order not only in himself, but also
in regard to another. Hence "justice is the most excellent of
virtues" (Ethic. v, 1). Among the other moral virtues, which are
about the passions, the more excellent the matter in which the
appetitive movement is subjected to reason, so much the more does the
rational good shine forth in each. Now in things touching man, the
chief of all is life, on which all other things depend. Consequently
fortitude which subjects the appetitive movement to reason in matters
of life and death, holds the first place among those moral virtues
that are about the passions, but is subordinate to justice. Hence the
Philosopher says (Rhet. 1) that "those virtues must needs be greatest
which receive the most praise: since virtue is a power of doing good.
Hence the brave man and the just man are honored more than others;
because the former," i.e. fortitude, "is useful in war, and the
latter," i.e. justice, "both in war and in peace." After fortitude
comes temperance, which subjects the appetite to reason in matters
directly relating to life, in the one individual, or in the one
species, viz. in matters of food and of sex. And so these three
virtues, together with prudence, are called principal virtues, in
excellence also.
A virtue is said
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