of his greater abundance of prudence, or also of charity, in
which all the infused virtues are connected.

Reply Obj. 2: One saint is praised chiefly for one virtue, another
saint for another virtue, on account of his more admirable readiness
for the act of one virtue than for the act of another virtue.

This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.
________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 3]

Whether the Moral Virtues Are Better Than the Intellectual Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues are better than the
intellectual. Because that which is more necessary, and more lasting,
is better. Now the moral virtues are "more lasting even than the
sciences" (Ethic. i) which are intellectual virtues: and, moreover,
they are more necessary for human life. Therefore they are preferable
to the intellectual virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, virtue is defined as "that which makes its possessor
good." Now man is said to be good in respect of moral virtue, and art
in respect of intellectual virtue, except perhaps in respect of
prudence alone. Therefore moral is better than intellectual virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, the end is more excellent than the means. But
according to _Ethic._ vi, 12, "moral virtue gives right intention of
the end; whereas prudence gives right choice of the means." Therefore
moral virtue is more excellent than prudence, which is the
intellectual virtue that regards moral matters.

_On the contrary,_ Moral virtue is in that part of the soul which is
rational by participation; while intellectual virtue is in the
essentially rational part, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 13. Now rational
by essence is more excellent than rational by participation.
Therefore intellectual virtue is better than moral virtue.

_I answer that,_ A thing may be said to be greater or less in two
ways: first, simply; secondly, relatively. For nothing hinders
something from being better simply, e.g. "learning than riches," and
yet not better relatively, i.e. "for one who is in want" [*Aristotle,
_Topic._ iii.]. Now to consider a thing simply is to consider it in
its proper specific nature. Accordingly, a virtue takes its species
from its object, as explained above (Q. 54, A. 2; Q. 60, A. 1).
Hence, speaking simply, that virtue is more excellent, which has the
more excellent object. Now it is evident that the object of the
reason is more excellent than the object of the appetite: since the
reason apprehe