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depending on prudence. But charity does not depend on prudence;
indeed, it surpasses prudence, according to Eph. 3:19: "The charity
of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge." Therefore the moral
virtues are not connected with charity, and can be without it.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 3:14): "He that loveth not,
abideth in death." Now the spiritual life is perfected by the
virtues, since it is "by them" that "we lead a good life," as
Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 17, 19). Therefore they cannot be
without the love of charity.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 63, A. 2), it is possible by
means of human works to acquire moral virtues, in so far as they
produce good works that are directed to an end not surpassing the
natural power of man: and when they are acquired thus, they can be
without charity, even as they were in many of the Gentiles. But in so
far as they produce good works in proportion to a supernatural last
end, thus they have the character of virtue, truly and perfectly; and
cannot be acquired by human acts, but are infused by God. Such like
moral virtues cannot be without charity. For it has been stated above
(A. 1; Q. 58, AA. 4, 5) that the other moral virtues cannot be
without prudence; and that prudence cannot be without the moral
virtues, because these latter make man well disposed to certain ends,
which are the starting-point of the procedure of prudence. Now for
prudence to proceed aright, it is much more necessary that man be
well disposed towards his ultimate end, which is the effect of
charity, than that he be well disposed in respect of other ends,
which is the effect of moral virtue: just as in speculative matters
right reason has greatest need of the first indemonstrable principle,
that "contradictories cannot both be true at the same time." It is
therefore evident that neither can infused prudence be without
charity; nor, consequently, the other moral virtues, since they
cannot be without prudence.

It is therefore clear from what has been said that only the infused
virtues are perfect, and deserve to be called virtues simply: since
they direct man well to the ultimate end. But the other virtues,
those, namely, that are acquired, are virtues in a restricted sense,
but not simply: for they direct man well in respect of the last end
in some particular genus of action, but not in respect of the last
end simply. Hence a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi