bove (Q. 60, A. 2): wherefore the rational mean in justice is
the same as the real mean, in so far, to wit as justice gives to each
one his due, neither more nor less. But the other moral virtues deal
with interior passions wherein the right cannot be established in the
same way, since men are variously situated in relation to their
passions; hence the rectitude of reason has to be established in the
passions, with due regard to us, who are moved in respect of the
passions.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two
arguments take the rational mean as being in the very act of reason,
while the third argues from the mean of justice.
________________________
THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 64, Art. 3]
Whether the Intellectual Virtues Observe the Mean?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not
observe the mean. Because moral virtue observes the mean by
conforming to the rule of reason. But the intellectual virtues are in
reason itself, so that they seem to have no higher rule. Therefore
the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean.
Obj. 2: Further, the mean of moral virtue is fixed by an intellectual
virtue: for it is stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6, that "virtue observes the
mean appointed by reason, as a prudent man would appoint it." If
therefore intellectual virtue also observe the mean, this mean will
have to be appointed for them by another virtue, so that there would
be an indefinite series of virtues.
Obj. 3: Further, a mean is, properly speaking, between contraries, as
the Philosopher explains (Metaph. x, text. 22, 23). But there seems
to be no contrariety in the intellect; since contraries themselves,
as they are in the intellect, are not in opposition to one another,
but are understood together, as white and black, healthy and sick.
Therefore there is no mean in the intellectual virtues.
_On the contrary,_ Art is an intellectual virtue; and yet there is a
mean in art (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore also intellectual virtue
observes the mean.
_I answer that,_ The good of anything consists in its observing the
mean, by conforming with a rule or measure in respect of which it may
happen to be excessive or deficient, as stated above (A. 1). Now
intellectual virtue, like moral virtue, is directed to the good, as
stated above (Q. 56, A. 3). Hence the good of an intellectual virtue
consists in observing the mean, in so far as it is subject to a
measure. Now the good of in
|