er the properties of virtues: and (1) the mean of
virtue, (2) the connection between virtues, (3) equality of virtues,
(4) the duration of virtues. Under the first head there are four
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether moral virtue observes the mean?

(2) Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean or the rational
mean?

(3) Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?

(4) Whether the theological virtues do?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 64, Art. 1]

Whether Moral Virtues Observe the Mean?

Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue does not observe the
mean. For the nature of a mean is incompatible with that which is
extreme. Now the nature of virtue is to be something extreme; for it
is stated in _De Coelo_ i that "virtue is the limit of power."
Therefore moral virtue does not observe the mean.

Obj. 2: Further, the maximum is not a mean. Now some moral virtues
tend to a maximum: for instance, magnanimity to very great honors,
and magnificence to very large expenditure, as stated in _Ethic._ iv,
2, 3. Therefore not every moral virtue observes the mean.

Obj. 3: Further, if it is essential to a moral virtue to observe the
mean, it follows that a moral virtue is not perfected, but the
contrary corrupted, through tending to something extreme. Now some
moral virtues are perfected by tending to something extreme; thus
virginity, which abstains from all sexual pleasure, observes the
extreme, and is the most perfect chastity: and to give all to the
poor is the most perfect mercy or liberality. Therefore it seems that
it is not essential to moral virtue that it should observe the mean.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral
virtue is a habit of choosing the mean."

_I answer that,_ As already explained (Q. 55, A. 3), the nature of
virtue is that it should direct man to good. Now moral virtue is
properly a perfection of the appetitive part of the soul in regard to
some determinate matter: and the measure or rule of the appetitive
movement in respect of appetible objects is the reason. But the good
of that which is measured or ruled consists in its conformity with
its rule: thus the good things made by art is that they follow the
rule of art. Consequently, in things of this sort, evil consists in
discordance from their rule or measure. Now this may happen either by
their exceeding the measure or by their falling short of it; as is
clearly the case in al