a good considered as in that virtue's
proper matter: thus the object of temperance is a good in respect of
the pleasures connected with the concupiscence of touch. The formal
aspect of this object is from reason which fixes the mean in these
concupiscences: while the material element is something on the part
of the concupiscences. Now it is evident that the mean that is
appointed in such like concupiscences according to the rule of human
reason, is seen under a different aspect from the mean which is fixed
according to Divine rule. For instance, in the consumption of food,
the mean fixed by human reason, is that food should not harm the
health of the body, nor hinder the use of reason: whereas, according
to the Divine rule, it behooves man to "chastise his body, and bring
it into subjection" (1 Cor. 9:27), by abstinence in food, drink and
the like. It is therefore evident that infused and acquired
temperance differ in species; and the same applies to the other
virtues.
The other specific difference among habits is taken from the things
to which they are directed: for a man's health and a horse's are not
of the same species, on account of the difference between the natures
to which their respective healths are directed. In the same sense,
the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3) that citizens have diverse
virtues according as they are well directed to diverse forms of
government. In the same way, too, those infused moral virtues,
whereby men behave well in respect of their being "fellow-citizens
with the saints, and of the household [Douay: 'domestics'] of God"
(Eph. 2:19), differ from the acquired virtues, whereby man behaves
well in respect of human affairs.
Reply Obj. 1: Infused and acquired virtue differ not only in relation
to the ultimate end, but also in relation to their proper objects, as
stated.
Reply Obj. 2: Both acquired and infused temperance moderate desires
for pleasures of touch, but for different reasons, as stated:
wherefore their respective acts are not identical.
Reply Obj. 3: God gave the man born blind an eye for the same act as
the act for which other eyes are formed naturally: consequently it
was of the same species. It would be the same if God wished to give a
man miraculously virtues, such as those that are acquired by acts.
But the case is not so in the question before us, as stated.
________________________
QUESTION 64
OF THE MEAN OF VIRTUE
(In Four Articles)
We must now consid
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