virtue of justice.
Therefore neither do those moral virtues that are about passions
differ according to the objects of those passions.

Obj. 2: Further, the passions are acts or movements of the sensitive
appetite. Now it needs a greater difference to differentiate habits
than acts. Hence diverse objects which do not diversify the species
of passions, do not diversify the species of moral virtue: so that
there is but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure, and the
same applies to the other passions.

Obj. 3: Further, more or less do not change a species. Now various
objects of pleasure differ only by reason of being more or less
pleasurable. Therefore all objects of pleasure belong to one species
of virtue: and for the same reason so do all fearful objects, and the
same applies to others. Therefore moral virtue is not diversified
according to the objects of the passions.

Obj. 4: Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it produces good. But
there are various virtues about the desires for good things: thus
temperance is about desires for the pleasure of touch, and
_eutrapelia_ about pleasures in games. Therefore there should be
different virtues about fears of evils.

_On the contrary,_ Chastity is about sexual pleasures, abstinence
about pleasures of the table, and _eutrapelia_ about pleasures in
games.

_I answer that,_ The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason;
whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive
appetite. Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according
to their relation to reason, but the passions according to their
relation to the appetite. Hence the objects of the passions,
according as they are variously related to the sensitive appetite,
cause the different species of passions: while, according as they are
related to reason, they cause the different species of virtues. Now
the movement of reason is not the same as that of the sensitive
appetite. Wherefore nothing hinders a difference of objects from
causing diversity of passions, without causing diversity of virtues,
as when one virtue is about several passions, as stated above (A. 4);
and again, a difference of objects from causing different virtues,
without causing a difference of passions, since several virtues are
directed about one passion, e.g. pleasure.

And because diverse passions belonging to diverse powers, always
belong to diverse virtues, as stated above (A. 4); therefore a
difference of obj