, both as to the subject and
as to the formal principle.
________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 61, Art. 3]

Whether Any Other Virtues Should Be Called Principal Rather Than These?

Objection 1: It would seem that other virtues should be called
principal rather than these. For, seemingly, the greatest is the
principal in any genus. Now "magnanimity has a great influence on all
the virtues" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity should more than
any be called a principal virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, that which strengthens the other virtues should
above all be called a principal virtue. But such is humility: for
Gregory says (Hom. iv in Ev.) that "he who gathers the other virtues
without humility is as one who carries straw against the wind."
Therefore humility seems above all to be a principal virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, that which is most perfect seems to be principal.
But this applies to patience, according to James 1:4: "Patience hath
a perfect work." Therefore patience should be reckoned a principal
virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De
Invent. Rhet. ii).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), these four are reckoned as
cardinal virtues, in respect of the four formal principles of virtue
as we understand it now. These principles are found chiefly in
certain acts and passions. Thus the good which exists in the act of
reason, is found chiefly in reason's command, but not in its counsel
or its judgment, as stated above (Q. 57, A. 6). Again, good as
defined by reason and put into our operations as something right and
due, is found chiefly in commutations and distributions in respect of
another person, and on a basis of equality. The good of curbing the
passions is found chiefly in those passions which are most difficult
to curb, viz. in the pleasures of touch. The good of being firm in
holding to the good defined by reason, against the impulse of
passion, is found chiefly in perils of death, which are most
difficult to withstand.

Accordingly the above four virtues may be considered in two ways.
First, in respect of their common formal principles. In this way they
are called principal, being general, as it were, in comparison with
all the virtues: so that, for instance, any virtue that causes good
in reason's act of consideration, may be called prudence; every
virtue that causes the good of right and due in operation, be called
justice; every virtue that curbs