ted
above (A. 2, ad 3). Now hope is a kind of emotion, since it is a
passion, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 2). Therefore charity, which is
love, precedes hope.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle enumerates them thus (1 Cor. 13:13):
"Now there remain faith, hope, charity."
_I answer that,_ Order is twofold: order of generation, and order of
perfection. By order of generation, in respect of which matter
precedes form, and the imperfect precedes the perfect, in one same
subject faith precedes hope, and hope charity, as to their acts:
because habits are all infused together. For the movement of the
appetite cannot tend to anything, either by hoping or loving, unless
that thing be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. Now it is
by faith that the intellect apprehends the object of hope and love.
Hence in the order of generation, faith precedes hope and charity. In
like manner a man loves a thing because he apprehends it as his good.
Now from the very fact that a man hopes to be able to obtain some
good through someone, he looks on the man in whom he hopes as a good
of his own. Hence for the very reason that a man hopes in someone, he
proceeds to love him: so that in the order of generation, hope
precedes charity as regards their respective acts.
But in the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope:
because both faith and hope are quickened by charity, and receive
from charity their full complement as virtues. For thus charity is
the mother and the root of all the virtues, inasmuch as it is the
form of them all, as we shall state further on (II-II, Q. 23, A. 8).
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply Obj. 2: Augustine is speaking of that hope whereby a man hopes
to obtain bliss through the merits which he has already: this belongs
to hope quickened by and following charity. But it is possible for a
man before having charity, to hope through merits not already
possessed, but which he hopes to possess.
Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 40, A. 7), in treating of the
passions, hope regards two things. One as its principal object, viz.
the good hoped for. With regard to this, love always precedes hope:
for good is never hoped for unless it be desired and loved. Hope also
regards the person from whom a man hopes to be able to obtain some
good. With regard to this, hope precedes love at first; though
afterwards hope is increased by love. Because from the fact that a
man thinks that he can
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