ude, another for temperance: and in
these ways, both intellectual and moral virtues are in us by way of a
natural aptitude, inchoatively, but not perfectly, since nature is
determined to one, while the perfection of these virtues does not
depend on one particular mode of action, but on various modes, in
respect of the various matters, which constitute the sphere of
virtue's action, and according to various circumstances.

It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature,
according to aptitude and inchoation, but not according to
perfection, except the theological virtues, which are entirely from
without.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two
argue about the nurseries of virtue which are in us by nature,
inasmuch as we are rational beings. The third objection must be taken
in the sense that, owing to the natural disposition which the body
has from birth, one has an aptitude for pity, another for living
temperately, another for some other virtue.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 63, Art. 2]

Whether Any Virtue Is Caused in Us by Habituation?

Objection 1: It would seem that virtues can not be caused in us by
habituation. Because a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent.
Prosperi cvi.] commenting on Rom. 14:23, "All that is not of faith is
sin," says: "The whole life of an unbeliever is a sin: and there is
no good without the Sovereign Good. Where knowledge of the truth is
lacking, virtue is a mockery even in the best behaved people." Now
faith cannot be acquired by means of works, but is caused in us by
God, according to Eph. 2:8: "By grace you are saved through faith."
Therefore no acquired virtue can be in us by habituation.

Obj. 2: Further, sin and virtue are contraries, so that they are
incompatible. Now man cannot avoid sin except by the grace of God,
according to Wis. 8:21: "I knew that I could not otherwise be
continent, except God gave it." Therefore neither can any virtues be
caused in us by habituation, but only by the gift of God.

Obj. 3: Further, actions which lead toward virtue, lack the
perfection of virtue. But an effect cannot be more perfect than its
cause. Therefore a virtue cannot be caused by actions that precede it.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that good is more
efficacious than evil. But vicious habits are caused by evil acts.
Much more, therefore, can virtuous habits be caused by good acts.

_I answer that,