e those which direct us to
God. Now, among the intellectual virtues there is one which directs
us to God: this is wisdom, which is about Divine things, since it
considers the highest cause. Therefore the theological virtues are
not distinct from the intellectual virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv) shows how the four
cardinal virtues are the "order of love." Now love is charity, which
is a theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues are not distinct
from the theological.

_On the contrary,_ That which is above man's nature is distinct from
that which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues
are above man's nature; while the intellectual and moral virtues are
in proportion to his nature, as clearly shown above (Q. 58, A. 3).
Therefore they are distinct from one another.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 54, A. 2, ad 1), habits are
specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal
difference of their objects. Now the object of the theological
virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the
knowledge of our reason. On the other hand, the object of the
intellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to human
reason. Wherefore the theological virtues are specifically distinct
from the moral and intellectual virtues.

Reply Obj. 1: The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's
intellect and appetite according to the capacity of human nature; the
theological virtues, supernaturally.

Reply Obj. 2: The wisdom which the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3, 7)
reckons as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine things so far as
they are open to the research of human reason. Theological virtue, on
the other hand, is about those same things so far as they surpass
human reason.

Reply Obj. 3: Though charity is love, yet love is not always charity.
When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of love, this
can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of the love
of charity. If it be understood of love, commonly so called, then
each virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each
cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions; and love is the root and
cause of every emotion, as stated above (Q. 27, A. 4; Q. 28, A. 6, ad
2; Q. 41, A. 2, ad 1). If, however, it be understood of the love of
charity, it does not mean that every other virtue is charity
essentially: but that all other virtues depend on charity in some