hat good
which we call honor, taken absolutely, as the object of love, we have
a virtue called _philotimia,_ i.e. _love of honor_: while if we
consider it as hard to attain, and as an object of hope, then we have
_magnanimity._ Wherefore liberality and _philotimia_ seem to be in
the concupiscible part, while magnificence and magnanimity are in the
irascible.

As regards man's good in relation to other men, it does not seem hard
to obtain, but is considered absolutely, as the object of the
concupiscible passions. This good may be pleasurable to a man in his
behavior towards another either in some serious matter, in actions,
to wit, that are directed by reason to a due end, or in playful
actions, viz. that are done for mere pleasure, and which do not stand
in the same relation to reason as the former. Now one man behaves
towards another in serious matters, in two ways. First, as being
pleasant in his regard, by becoming speech and deeds: and this
belongs to a virtue which Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) calls "friendship"
[*_philia_], and may be rendered "affability." Secondly, one man
behaves towards another by being frank with him, in words and deeds:
this belongs to another virtue which (Ethic. iv, 7) he calls
"truthfulness" [*_aletheia_]. For frankness is more akin to the
reason than pleasure, and serious matters than play. Hence there is
another virtue about the pleasures of games, which the Philosopher
calls _eutrapelia_ (Ethic. iv, 8).

It is therefore evident that, according to Aristotle, there are ten
moral virtues about the passions, viz. fortitude, temperance,
liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, _philotimia,_ gentleness,
friendship, truthfulness, and _eutrapelia,_ all of which differ in
respect of their diverse matter, passions, or objects: so that if we
add _justice,_ which is about operations, there will be eleven in all.

Reply Obj. 1: All objects of the same specific operation have the
same relation to reason: not so all the objects of the same specific
passion; because operations do not thwart reason as the passions do.

Reply Obj. 2: Passions are not differentiated by the same rule as
virtues are, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: More and less do not cause a difference of species,
unless they bear different relations to reason.

Reply Obj. 4: Good is a more potent mover than evil: because evil
does not cause movement save in virtue of good, as Dionysius states
(Div. Nom. iv). Hence an evil does not pro