ects that corresponds to a difference of powers
always causes a specific difference of virtues--for instance the
difference between that which is good absolutely speaking, and that
which is good and difficult to obtain. Moreover since the reason
rules man's lower powers in a certain order, and even extends to
outward things; hence, one single object of the passions, according
as it is apprehended by sense, imagination, or reason, and again,
according as it belongs to the soul, body, or external things, has
various relations to reason, and consequently is of a nature to cause
a difference of virtues. Consequently man's good which is the object
of love, desire and pleasure, may be taken as referred either to a
bodily sense, or to the inner apprehension of the mind: and this same
good may be directed to man's good in himself, either in his body or
in his soul, or to man's good in relation to other men. And every
such difference, being differently related to reason, differentiates
virtues.
Accordingly, if we take a good, and it be something discerned by the
sense of touch, and something pertaining to the upkeep of human life
either in the individual or in the species, such as the pleasures of
the table or of sexual intercourse, it will belong to the virtue of
_temperance._ As regards the pleasures of the other senses, they are
not intense, and so do not present much difficulty to the reason:
hence there is no virtue corresponding to them; for virtue, "like
art, is about difficult things" (Ethic. ii, 3).
On the other hand, good discerned not by the senses, but by an inner
power, and belonging to man in himself, is like money and honor; the
former, by its very nature, being employable for the good of the
body, while the latter is based on the apprehension of the mind.
These goods again may be considered either absolutely, in which way
they concern the concupiscible faculty, or as being difficult to
obtain, in which way they belong to the irascible part: which
distinction, however, has no place in pleasurable objects of touch;
since such are of base condition, and are becoming to man in so far
as he has something in common with irrational animals. Accordingly in
reference to money considered as a good absolutely, as an object of
desire, pleasure, or love, there is _liberality_: but if we consider
this good as difficult to get, and as being the object of our hope,
there is _magnificence_ [*_megaloprepeia_]. With regard to t
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