human virtue. Now human virtue, as stated above (Q. 56, A.
3), is one that answers to the perfect idea of virtue, which requires
rectitude of the appetite: for such like virtue not only confers the
faculty of doing well, but also causes the good deed done. On the
other hand, the name virtue is applied to one that answers
imperfectly to the idea of virtue, and does not require rectitude of
the appetite: because it merely confers the faculty of doing well
without causing the good deed to be done. Now it is evident that the
perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect: and so those
virtues which imply rectitude of the appetite are called principal
virtues. Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the
intellectual virtues, for it is also something of a moral virtue, as
was clearly shown above (Q. 57, A. 4). Consequently, those virtues
which are called principal or cardinal are fittingly placed among the
moral virtues.

Reply Obj. 1: When a univocal genus is divided into its species, the
members of the division are on a par in the point of the generic
idea; although considered in their nature as things, one species may
surpass another in rank and perfection, as man in respect of other
animals. But when we divide an analogous term, which is applied to
several things, but to one before it is applied to another, nothing
hinders one from ranking before another, even in the point of the
generic idea; as the notion of being is applied to substance
principally in relation to accident. Such is the division of virtue
into various kinds of virtue: since the good defined by reason is not
found in the same way in all things.

Reply Obj. 2: The theological virtues are above man, as stated above
(Q. 58, A. 3, ad 3). Hence they should properly be called not human,
but "super-human" or godlike virtues.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the intellectual virtues, except in prudence,
rank before the moral virtues, in the point of their subject, they do
not rank before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards good,
which is the object of the appetite.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 61, Art. 5]

Whether There Are Four Cardinal Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues.
For prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues,
as is clear from what has been said above (Q. 58, A. 4). But that
which directs other things ranks before them. Therefore prudence
alone