rary passions stands in the same ratio to both, even as
in the natural order there is but one mean between contraries, e.g.
between black and white. Secondly, because there are different
passions contradicting reason in the same manner, e.g. by impelling
to that which is contrary to reason, or by withdrawing from that
which is in accord with reason. Wherefore the different passions of
the concupiscible faculty do not require different moral virtues,
because their movements follow one another in a certain order, as
being directed to the one same thing, viz. the attainment of some
good or the avoidance of some evil: thus from love proceeds desire,
and from desire we arrive at pleasure; and it is the same with the
opposite passions, for hatred leads to avoidance or dislike, and this
leads to sorrow. On the other hand, the irascible passions are not
all of one order, but are directed to different things: for daring
and fear are about some great danger; hope and despair are about some
difficult good; while anger seeks to overcome something contrary
which has wrought harm. Consequently there are different virtues
about such like passions: e.g. temperance, about the concupiscible
passions; fortitude, about fear and daring; magnanimity, about hope
and despair; meekness, about anger.
Reply Obj. 1: All the passions concur in one common principle and
end; but not in one proper principle or end: and so this does not
suffice for the unity of moral virtue.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as in the natural order the same principle causes
movement from one extreme and movement towards the other; and as in
the intellectual order contraries have one common ratio; so too
between contrary passions there is but one moral virtue, which, like
a second nature, consents to reason's dictates.
Reply Obj. 3: Those three passions are directed to the same object in
a certain order, as stated above: and so they belong to the same
virtue.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 60, Art. 5]
Whether the Moral Virtues Differ in Point of the Various Objects of
the Passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues do not differ
according to the objects of the passions. For just as there are
objects of passions, so are there objects of operations. Now those
moral virtues that are about operations, do not differ according to
the objects of those operations: for the buying and selling either of
a house or of a horse belong to the one same
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