that is active through the command of another virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: There is the same kind of due in all the
operations belonging to special justice. Consequently, there is the
same virtue of justice, especially in regard to commutations. For it
may be that distributive justice is of another species from
commutative justice; but about this we shall inquire later on
(II-II, Q. 61, A. 1).
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 60, Art. 4]

Whether There Are Different Moral Virtues About Different Passions?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not different moral virtues
about different passions. For there is but one habit about things
that concur in their source and end: as is evident especially in the
case of sciences. But the passions all concur in one source, viz.
love; and they all terminate in the same end, viz. joy or sorrow, as
we stated above (Q. 25, AA. 1, 2, 4; Q. 27, A. 4). Therefore there is
but one moral virtue about all the passions.

Obj. 2: Further, if there were different moral virtues about
different passions, it would follow that there are as many moral
virtues as passions. But this clearly is not the case: since there is
one moral virtue about contrary passions; namely, fortitude, about
fear and daring; temperance, about pleasure and sorrow. Therefore
there is no need for different moral virtues about different passions.

Obj. 3: Further, love, desire, and pleasure are passions of different
species, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4). Now there is but one virtue
about all these three, viz. temperance. Therefore there are not
different moral virtues about different passions.

_On the contrary,_ Fortitude is about fear and daring; temperance
about desire; meekness about anger; as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 6, 10;
iv, 5.

_I answer that,_ It cannot be said that there is only one moral
virtue about all the passions: since some passions are not in the
same power as other passions; for some belong to the irascible,
others to the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1).

On the other hand, neither does every diversity of passions
necessarily suffice for a diversity of moral virtues. First, because
some passions are in contrary opposition to one another, such as joy
and sorrow, fear and daring, and so on. About such passions as are
thus in opposition to one another there must needs be one same
virtue. Because, since moral virtue consists in a kind of mean, the
mean in cont