ction
belongs properly to the appetitive power, whose function it is to
move all the powers to their acts, as explained above (Q. 9, A. 1).
Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue, but only those that are
in the appetitive faculty.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes _mos_ in the sense of _custom._

Reply Obj. 2: Every act of virtue can be done from choice: but no
virtue makes us choose aright, save that which is in the appetitive
part of the soul: for it has been stated above that choice is an act
of the appetitive faculty (Q. 13, A. 1). Wherefore a habit of
choosing, i.e. a habit which is the principle whereby we choose, is
that habit alone which perfects the appetitive faculty: although the
acts of other habits also may be a matter of choice.

Reply Obj. 3: "Nature is the principle of movement" (Phys. ii, text.
3). Now to move the faculties to act is the proper function of the
appetitive power. Consequently to become as a second nature by
consenting to the reason, is proper to those virtues which are in the
appetitive faculty.
________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 58, Art. 2]

Whether Moral Virtue Differs from Intellectual Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue does not differ from
intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 21) "that
virtue is the art of right conduct." But art is an intellectual
virtue. Therefore moral and intellectual virtue do not differ.

Obj. 2: Further, some authors put science in the definition of
virtues: thus some define perseverance as a "science or habit
regarding those things to which we should hold or not hold"; and
holiness as "a science which makes man to be faithful and to do his
duty to God." Now science is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral
virtue should not be distinguished from intellectual virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 6) that "virtue is the
rectitude and perfection of reason." But this belongs to the
intellectual virtues, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 13. Therefore moral
virtue does not differ from intellectual.

Obj. 4: Further, a thing does not differ from that which is included
in its definition. But intellectual virtue is included in the
definition of moral virtue: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6)
that "moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean appointed by
reason as a prudent man would appoint it." Now this right reason that
fixes the mean of moral virtue, belongs to an intellectual