,
desisting from pleasures, and perseverance in the midst of pains, are
not virtues, but something less than a virtue, as the Philosopher
maintains (Ethic. vii, 1, 9).

Reply Obj. 3: Faith, hope, and charity are superhuman virtues: for
they are virtues of man as sharing in the grace of God.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 58, Art. 4]

Whether There Can Be Moral Without Intellectual Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that moral can be without intellectual
virtue. Because moral virtue, as Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) is
"a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Now though
nature may be in accord with some sovereign reason that moves it,
there is no need for that reason to be united to nature in the same
subject, as is evident of natural things devoid of knowledge.
Therefore in a man there may be a moral virtue like a second nature,
inclining him to consent to his reason, without his reason being
perfected by an intellectual virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, by means of intellectual virtue man obtains perfect
use of reason. But it happens at times that men are virtuous and
acceptable to God, without being vigorous in the use of reason.
Therefore it seems that moral virtue can be without intellectual.

Obj. 3: Further moral virtue makes us inclined to do good works. But
some, without depending on the judgment of reason, have a natural
inclination to do good works. Therefore moral virtues can be without
intellectual virtues.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxii) that "the other
virtues, unless we do prudently what we desire to do, cannot be real
virtues." But prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above (Q.
57, A. 5). Therefore moral virtues cannot be without intellectual
virtues.

_I answer that,_ Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual
virtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art; but not without understanding
and prudence. Moral virtue cannot be without prudence, because it is
a habit of choosing, i.e. making us choose well. Now in order that a
choice be good, two things are required. First, that the intention be
directed to a due end; and this is done by moral virtue, which
inclines the appetitive faculty to the good that is in accord with
reason, which is a due end. Secondly, that man take rightly those
things which have reference to the end: and this he cannot do unless
his reason counsel, judge and command aright, which is the function
of prudence and the