m" (Ethic. iii, 5). Consequently the
right reason about things to be done, viz. prudence, requires man to
have moral virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Reason, as apprehending the end, precedes the appetite
for the end: but appetite for the end precedes the reason, as arguing
about the choice of the means, which is the concern of prudence. Even
so, in speculative matters the understanding of principles is the
foundation on which the syllogism of the reason is based.

Reply Obj. 2: It does not depend on the disposition of our appetite
whether we judge well or ill of the principles of art, as it does,
when we judge of the end which is the principle in moral matters: in
the former case our judgment depends on reason alone. Hence art does
not require a virtue perfecting the appetite, as prudence does.

Reply Obj. 3: Prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel, but
also to judge and command well. This is not possible unless the
impediment of the passions, destroying the judgment and command of
prudence, be removed; and this is done by moral virtue.
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QUESTION 59

OF MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS
(In Five Articles)

We must now consider the difference of one moral virtue from another.
And since those moral virtues which are about the passions, differ
accordingly to the difference of passions, we must consider (1) the
relation of virtue to passion; (2) the different kinds of moral
virtue in relation to the passions. Under the first head there are
five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether moral virtue is a passion?

(2) Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?

(3) Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?

(4) Whether every moral virtue is about a passion?

(5) Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 59, Art. 1]

Whether Moral Virtue Is a Passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue is a passion. Because
the mean is of the same genus as the extremes. But moral virtue is a
mean between two passions. Therefore moral virtue is a passion.

Obj. 2: Further, virtue and vice, being contrary to one another, are
in the same genus. But some passions are reckoned to be vices, such
as envy and anger. Therefore some passions are virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, pity is a passion, since it is sorrow for another's
ills, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 8). Now "Cicero the renowned orator
did not hesitate to call pity a virtue,