of anything depends on the condition of its
nature. Now there is no sensitive appetite in God and the angels, as
there is in man. Consequently good operation in God and the angels is
altogether without passion, as it is without a body: whereas the good
operation of man is with passion, even as it is produced with the
body's help.
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QUESTION 60

HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another:
under which head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is only one moral virtue?

(2) Whether those moral virtues which are about operations, are
distinct from those which are about passions?

(3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations?

(4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different
passions?

(5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects
of the passions?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 60, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Only One Moral Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is only one moral virtue.
Because just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason
which is the subject of the intellectual virtues; so does their
inclination belong to the appetite which is the subject of moral
virtues. But there is only one intellectual virtue to direct all
moral acts, viz. prudence. Therefore there is also but one moral
virtue to give all moral acts their respective inclinations.

Obj. 2: Further, habits differ, not in respect of their material
objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects. Now the
formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one
thing, viz. the mean defined by reason. Therefore, seemingly, there
is but one moral virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, things pertaining to morals are specified by their
end, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 3). Now there is but one common end of
all moral virtues, viz. happiness, while the proper and proximate
ends are infinite in number. But the moral virtues themselves are not
infinite in number. Therefore it seems that there is but one.

_On the contrary,_ One habit cannot be in several powers, as stated
above (Q. 56, A. 2). But the subject of the moral virtues is the
appetitive part of the soul, which is divided into several powers, as
stated in the First Part (Q. 80, A. 2; Q. 81, A. 2). Therefore there
cannot be only one moral virtue.

_I answer that,_