hily sorrow for another's sin. Therefore sorrow is
compatible with moral virtue in the same way as the other passions
are when moderated by reason.
Their second reason for holding this opinion was that sorrow is about
evil present, whereas fear is for evil to come: even as pleasure is
about a present good, while desire is for a future good. Now the
enjoyment of a good possessed, or the desire to have good that one
possesses not, may be consistent with virtue: but depression of the
mind resulting from sorrow for a present evil, is altogether contrary
to reason: wherefore it is incompatible with virtue. But this is
unreasonable. For there is an evil which can be present to the
virtuous man, as we have just stated; which evil is rejected by
reason. Wherefore the sensitive appetite follows reason's rejection
by sorrowing for that evil; yet moderately, according as reason
dictates. Now it pertains to virtue that the sensitive appetite be
conformed to reason, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). Wherefore
moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful, is a
mark of virtue; as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6, 7).
Moreover, this proves useful for avoiding evil: since, just as good
is more readily sought for the sake of pleasure, so is evil more
undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow.
Accordingly we must allow that sorrow for things pertaining to virtue
is incompatible with virtue: since virtue rejoices in its own. On the
other hand, virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no
matter how.
Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted proves that the wise man is not made
sorrowful by wisdom. Yet he sorrows for anything that hinders wisdom.
Consequently there is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom
there can be no hindrance to wisdom.
Reply Obj. 2: Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful: but it
helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow.
Reply Obj. 3: Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind: but
moderate sorrow is the mark of a well-conditioned mind, according to
the present state of life.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 59, Art. 4]
Whether All the Moral Virtues Are About the Passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the moral virtues are about the
passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue
is about objects of pleasure and sorrow." But pleasure and sorrow are
passions, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4; Q. 31, A. 1; Q. 35
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