reason, does not depend on moral virtue, which is a
perfection of the appetitive faculty; and can be without it.

Obj. 2: Further, morals are the matter of prudence, even as things
makeable are the matter of art. Now art can be without its proper
matter, as a smith without iron. Therefore prudence can be without
the moral virtues, although of all the intellectual virtues, it seems
most akin to the moral virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, prudence is "a virtue whereby we are of good
counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now many are of good counsel without having
the moral virtues. Therefore prudence can be without a moral virtue.

_On the contrary,_ To wish to do evil is directly opposed to moral
virtue; and yet it is not opposed to anything that can be without
moral virtue. Now it is contrary to prudence "to sin willingly"
(Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence cannot be without moral virtue.

_I answer that,_ Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot,
be without moral virtue. The reason for this is that prudence is the
right reason about things to be done (and this, not merely in
general, but also in particular); about which things actions are. Now
right reason demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue.
And when reason argues about particular cases, it needs not only
universal but also particular principles. As to universal principles
of action, man is rightly disposed by the natural understanding of
principles, whereby he understands that he should do no evil; or
again by some practical science. But this is not enough in order that
man may reason aright about particular cases. For it happens
sometimes that the aforesaid universal principle, known by means of
understanding or science, is destroyed in a particular case by a
passion: thus to one who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is
overcome thereby, the object of his desire seems good, although it is
opposed to the universal judgment of his reason. Consequently, as by
the habit of natural understanding or of science, man is made to be
rightly disposed in regard to the universal principles of action; so,
in order that he be rightly disposed with regard to the particular
principles of action, viz. the ends, he needs to be perfected by
certain habits, whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to
judge aright to the end. This is done by moral virtue: for the
virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue, because "such a man
is, such does the end seem to hi