virtues annexed to it, as stated above (Q. 57,
AA. 5, 6). Wherefore there can be no moral virtue without prudence:
and consequently neither can there be without understanding. For it
is by the virtue of understanding that we know self-evident
principles both in speculative and in practical matters. Consequently
just as right reason in speculative matters, in so far as it proceeds
from naturally known principles, presupposes the understanding of
those principles, so also does prudence, which is the right reason
about things to be done.

Reply Obj. 1: The inclination of nature in things devoid of reason is
without choice: wherefore such an inclination does not of necessity
require reason. But the inclination of moral virtue is with choice:
and consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires that
reason be perfected by intellectual virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: A man may be virtuous without having full use of reason
as to everything, provided he have it with regard to those things
which have to be done virtuously. In this way all virtuous men have
full use of reason. Hence those who seem to be simple, through lack
of worldly cunning, may possibly be prudent, according to Matt.
10:16: "Be ye therefore prudent (Douay: 'wise') as serpents, and
simple as doves."

Reply Obj. 3: The natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind
of beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue. For the stronger
this inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be, unless it
be accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice of fitting
means towards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind, the
faster it runs the more heavily will it fall, and the more grievously
will it be hurt. And consequently, although moral virtue be not right
reason, as Socrates held, yet not only is it "according to right
reason," in so far as it inclines man to that which is, according to
right reason, as the Platonists maintained [*Cf. Plato, Meno xli.];
but also it needs to be "joined with right reason," as Aristotle
declares (Ethic. vi, 13).
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 58, Art. 5]

Whether There Can Be Intellectual Without Moral Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be intellectual without
moral virtue. Because perfection of what precedes does not depend on
the perfection of what follows. Now reason precedes and moves the
sensitive appetite. Therefore intellectual virtue, which is a
perfection of the