And so moral differs from intellectual virtue,
even as the appetite differs from the reason. Hence just as the
appetite is the principle of human acts, in so far as it partakes of
reason, so are moral habits to be considered virtues in so far as
they are in conformity with reason.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine usually applies the term "art" to any form of
right reason; in which sense art includes prudence which is the right
reason about things to be done, even as art is the right reason about
things to be made. Accordingly, when he says that "virtue is the art
of right conduct," this applies to prudence essentially; but to other
virtues, by participation, for as much as they are directed by
prudence.
Reply Obj. 2: All such definitions, by whomsoever given, were based
on the Socratic theory, and should be explained according to what we
have said about art (ad 1).
The same applies to the Third Objection.
Reply Obj. 4: Right reason which is in accord with prudence is
included in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its
essence, but as something belonging by way of participation to all
the moral virtues, in so far as they are all under the direction of
prudence.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 58, Art. 3]
Whether Virtue Is Adequately Divided into Moral and Intellectual?
Objection 1: It would seem that virtue is not adequately divided into
moral and intellectual. For prudence seems to be a mean between moral
and intellectual virtue, since it is reckoned among the intellectual
virtues (Ethic. vi, 3, 5); and again is placed by all among the four
cardinal virtues, which are moral virtues, as we shall show further
on (Q. 61, A. 1). Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into
intellectual and moral, as though there were no mean between them.
Obj. 2: Further, continency, perseverance, and patience are not
reckoned to be intellectual virtues. Yet neither are they moral
virtues; since they do not reduce the passions to a mean, and are
consistent with an abundance of passion. Therefore virtue is not
adequately divided into intellectual and moral.
Obj. 3: Further, faith, hope, and charity are virtues. Yet they are
not intellectual virtues: for there are only five of these, viz.
science, wisdom, understanding, prudence, and art, as stated above
(Q. 57, AA. 2, 3, 5). Neither are they moral virtues; since they are
not about the passions, which are the chief concern of moral virtue.
Therefore
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