er
principles: because, if we were in possession of these, we should
need no more to inquire, the truth would be already discovered. Hence
only one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, wheres there
are two virtues for good judgment: because difference is based not on
common but on proper principles. Consequently, even in speculative
matters, there is one science of dialectics, which inquires about all
matters; whereas demonstrative sciences, which pronounce judgment,
differ according to their different objects. _Synesis_ and _gnome_
differ in respect of the different rules on which judgment is based:
for _synesis_ judges of actions according to the common law; while
_gnome_ bases its judgment on the natural law, in those cases where
the common law fails to apply, as we shall explain further on (II-II,
Q. 51, A. 4).

Reply Obj. 4: Memory, understanding and foresight, as also caution
and docility and the like, are not virtues distinct from prudence:
but are, as it were, integral parts thereof, in so far as they are
all requisite for perfect prudence. There are, moreover, subjective
parts or species of prudence, e.g. domestic and political economy,
and the like. But the three first names are, in a fashion, potential
parts of prudence; because they are subordinate thereto, as secondary
virtues to a principal virtue: and we shall speak of them later
(II-II, Q. 48, seqq.).
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QUESTION 58

OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES
(In Five Articles)

We must now consider moral virtues. We shall speak (1) of the
difference between them and intellectual virtues; (2) of their
distinction, one from another, in respect of their proper matter;
(3) of the difference between the chief or cardinal virtues and
the others.

Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?

(2) Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?

(3) Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual
virtue?

(4) Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?

(5) Whether, on the other hand, there can be intellectual without
moral virtue?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 58, Art. 1]

Whether Every Virtue Is a Moral Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that every virtue is a moral virtue.
Because moral virtue is so called from the Latin _mos,_ i.e. custom.
Now, we can accustom ourselves to the acts