us matters to pass judgment
on, so are there different points on which one has to take counsel.
But there is one virtue referring to all matters of counsel.
Therefore, in order to judge well of what has to be done, there is no
need, besides _synesis,_ of the virtue of _gnome_.

Obj. 4: Further, Cicero (De Invent. Rhet. iii) mentions three other
parts of prudence; viz. "memory of the past, understanding of the
present, and foresight of the future." Moreover, Macrobius (Super
Somn. Scip. 1) mentions yet others: viz. "caution, docility," and the
like. Therefore it seems that the above are not the only virtues
annexed to prudence.

_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of the Philosopher (Ethic.
vi, 9, 10, 11), who assigns these three virtues as being annexed to
prudence.

_I answer that,_ Wherever several powers are subordinate to one
another, that power is the highest which is ordained to the highest
act. Now there are three acts of reason in respect of anything done
by man: the first of these is counsel; the second, judgment; the
third, command. The first two correspond to those acts of the
speculative intellect, which are inquiry and judgment, for counsel is
a kind of inquiry: but the third is proper to the practical
intellect, in so far as this is ordained to operation; for reason
does not have to command in things that man cannot do. Now it is
evident that in things done by man, the chief act is that of command,
to which all the rest are subordinate. Consequently, that virtue
which perfects the command, viz. prudence, as obtaining the highest
place, has other secondary virtues annexed to it, viz. _eustochia_,
which perfects counsel; and _synesis_ and _gnome_, which are parts of
prudence in relation to judgment, and of whose distinction we shall
speak further on (ad 3).

Reply Obj. 1: Prudence makes us be of good counsel, not as though its
immediate act consisted in being of good counsel, but because it
perfects the latter act by means of a subordinate virtue, viz.
_euboulia_.

Reply Obj. 2: Judgment about what is to be done is directed to
something further: for it may happen in some matter of action that a
man's judgment is sound, while his execution is wrong. The matter
does not attain to its final complement until the reason has
commanded aright in the point of what has to be done.

Reply Obj. 3: Judgment of anything should be based on that thing's
proper principles. But inquiry does not reach to the prop