in taking
counsel about what is to be done; since human actions are about
things that may be otherwise than they are. Hence it is written (Wis.
9:14): "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels
uncertain." Therefore it seems that prudence should not be reckoned
an intellectual virtue.
_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned with other virtues necessary for
human life, when it is written (Wis. 8:7) of Divine Wisdom: "She
teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which
are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life."
_I answer that,_ Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life.
For a good life consists in good deeds. Now in order to do good
deeds, it matters not only what a man does, but also how he does it;
to wit, that he do it from right choice and not merely from impulse
or passion. And, since choice is about things in reference to the
end, rectitude of choice requires two things: namely, the due end,
and something suitably ordained to that due end. Now man is suitably
directed to his due end by a virtue which perfects the soul in the
appetitive part, the object of which is the good and the end. And to
that which is suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be
rightly disposed by a habit in his reason, because counsel and
choice, which are about things ordained to the end, are acts of the
reason. Consequently an intellectual virtue is needed in the reason,
to perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things
ordained to the end; and this virtue is prudence. Consequently
prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life.
Reply Obj. 1: The good of an art is to be found, not in the
craftsman, but in the product of the art, since art is right reason
about things to be made: for since the making of a thing passes into
external matter, it is a perfection not of the maker, but of the
thing made, even as movement is the act of the thing moved: and art
is concerned with the making of things. On the other hand, the good
of prudence is in the active principle, whose activity is its
perfection: for prudence is right reason about things to be done, as
stated above (A. 4). Consequently art does not require of the
craftsman that his act be a good act, but that his work be good.
Rather would it be necessary for the thing made to act well (e.g.
that a knife should carve well, or that a saw should cut well), if it
were proper to such things to act, rather tha
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