ly Obj. 2: "To know" is a condition required for moral virtue,
inasmuch as moral virtue works according to right reason. But moral
virtue is essentially in the appetite.

Reply Obj. 3: Prudence is really subjected in reason: but it
presupposes as its principle the rectitude of the will, as we shall
see further on (A. 3; Q. 57, A. 4).
________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 56, Art. 3]

Whether the Intellect Can Be the Subject of Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect is not the subject of
virtue. For Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that all virtue is
love. But the subject of love is not the intellect, but the
appetitive power alone. Therefore no virtue is in the intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, virtue is referred to good, as is clear from what
has been said above (Q. 55, A. 3). Now good is not the object of the
intellect, but of the appetitive power. Therefore the subject of
virtue is not the intellect, but the appetitive power.

Obj. 3: Further, virtue is that "which makes its possessor good," as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6). But the habit which perfects the
intellect does not make its possessor good: since a man is not said
to be a good man on account of his science or his art. Therefore the
intellect is not the subject of virtue.

_On the contrary,_ The mind is chiefly called the intellect. But the
subject of virtue is the mind, as is clear from the definition, above
given, of virtue (Q. 55, A. 4). Therefore the intellect is the
subject of virtue.

_I answer that,_ As we have said above (Q. 55, A. 3), a virtue is a
habit by which we work well. Now a habit may be directed to a good
act in two ways. First, in so far as by the habit a man acquires an
aptness to a good act; for instance, by the habit of grammar man has
the aptness to speak correctly. But grammar does not make a man
always speak correctly: for a grammarian may be guilty of a barbarism
or make a solecism: and the case is the same with other sciences and
arts. Secondly, a habit may confer not only aptness to act, but also
the right use of that aptness: for instance, justice not only gives
man the prompt will to do just actions, but also makes him act justly.

And since good, and, in like manner, being, is said of a thing
simply, in respect, not of what it is potentially, but of what it is
actually: therefore from having habits of the latter sort, man is
said simply to do good, and to be good; for instance, becaus