he will, which is
the rational appetite, through being moved by it. And therefore the
act of the appetitive power is consummated in the sensitive appetite:
and for this reason the sensitive appetite is the subject of virtue.
Whereas the sensitive powers of apprehension are related to the
intellect rather through moving it; for the reason that the phantasms
are related to the intellective soul, as colors to sight (De Anima
iii, text. 18). And therefore the act of knowledge is terminated in
the intellect; and for this reason the cognoscitive virtues are in
the intellect itself, or the reason.
And thus is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply Obj. 3: Memory is not a part of prudence, as species is of a
genus, as though memory were a virtue properly so called: but one of
the conditions required for prudence is a good memory; so that, in a
fashion, it is after the manner of an integral part.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 56, Art. 6]
Whether the Will Can Be the Subject of Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not the subject of
virtue. Because no habit is required for that which belongs to a
power by reason of its very nature. But since the will is in the
reason, it is of the very essence of the will, according to the
Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42), to tend to that which is good,
according to reason. And to this good every virtue is ordered, since
everything naturally desires its own proper good; for virtue, as
Tully says in his Rhetoric, is a "habit like a second nature in
accord with reason." Therefore the will is not the subject of virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, every virtue is either intellectual or moral (Ethic.
i, 13; ii, 1). But intellectual virtue is subjected in the intellect
and reason, and not in the will: while moral virtue is subjected in
the irascible and concupiscible powers which are rational by
participation. Therefore no virtue is subjected in the will.
Obj. 3: Further, all human acts, to which virtues are ordained, are
voluntary. If therefore there be a virtue in the will in respect of
some human acts, in like manner there will be a virtue in the will in
respect of all human acts. Either, therefore, there will be no virtue
in any other power, or there will be two virtues ordained to the same
act, which seems unreasonable. Therefore the will cannot be the
subject of virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Greater perfection is required in the mover than
in
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