at genus of knowable matter, it is _science_ which perfects
the intellect. Wherefore according to the different kinds of knowable
matter, there are different habits of scientific knowledge; whereas
there is but one wisdom.
Reply Obj. 1: Wisdom is a kind of science, in so far as it has that
which is common to all the sciences; viz. to demonstrate conclusions
from principles. But since it has something proper to itself above
the other sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all, not only as to
their conclusions, but also as to their first principles, therefore
it is a more perfect virtue than science.
Reply Obj. 2: When the formal aspect of the object is referred to a
power or habit by one same act, there is no distinction of habit or
power in respect of the formal aspect and of the material object:
thus it belongs to the same power of sight to see both color, and
light, which is the formal aspect under which color is seen, and is
seen at the same time as the color. On the other hand, the principles
of a demonstration can be considered apart, without the conclusion
being considered at all. Again they can be considered together with
the conclusions, since the conclusions can be deduced from them.
Accordingly, to consider the principles in this second way, belongs
to science, which considers the conclusions also: while to consider
the principles in themselves belongs to understanding.
Consequently, if we consider the point aright, these three virtues
are distinct, not as being on a par with one another, but in a
certain order. The same is to be observed in potential wholes,
wherein one part is more perfect than another; for instance, the
rational soul is more perfect than the sensitive soul; and the
sensitive, than the vegetal. For it is thus that science depends on
understanding as on a virtue of higher degree: and both of these
depend on wisdom, as obtaining the highest place, and containing
beneath itself both understanding and science, by judging both of the
conclusions of science, and of the principles on which they are based.
Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 55, AA. 3, 4), a virtuous habit has
a fixed relation to good, and is nowise referable to evil. Now the
good of the intellect is truth, and falsehood is its evil. Wherefore
those habits alone are called intellectual virtues, whereby we tell
the truth and never tell a falsehood. But opinion and suspicion can
be about both truth and falsehood: and so, as sta
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