s its unity.

Reply Obj. 1: That a habit is engendered little by little, is due,
not to one part being engendered after another, but to the fact that
the subject does not acquire all at once a firm and difficultly
changeable disposition; and also to the fact that it begins by being
imperfectly in the subject, and is gradually perfected. The same
applies to other qualities.

Reply Obj. 2: The parts which are assigned to each cardinal virtue,
are not integral parts that combine to form a whole; but subjective
or potential parts, as we shall explain further on (Q. 57, A. 6, ad
4; II-II, Q. 48).

Reply Obj. 3: In any science, he who acquires, by demonstration,
scientific knowledge of one conclusion, has the habit indeed, yet
imperfectly. And when he obtains, by demonstration, the scientific
knowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is engendered in
him: but the habit which was in him previously is perfected,
forasmuch as it has increased in extent; because the conclusions and
demonstrations of one science are coordinate, and one flows from
another.
________________________

TREATISE ON HABITS IN PARTICULAR (QQ. 55-89):
GOOD HABITS, i.e., VIRTUES (QQ. 55-70)
________________________

QUESTION 55

OF THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE
(In Four Articles)

We come now to the consideration of habits specifically. And since
habits, as we have said (Q. 54, A. 3), are divided into good and bad,
we must speak in the first place of good habits, which are virtues,
and of other matters connected with them, namely the Gifts,
Beatitudes and Fruits; in the second place, of bad habits, namely of
vices and sins. Now five things must be considered about virtues:
(1) the essence of virtue; (2) its subject; (3) the division of
virtue; (4) the cause of virtue; (5) certain properties of virtue.

Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether human virtue is a habit?

(2) Whether it is an operative habit?

(3) Whether it is a good habit?

(4) Of the definition of virtue.
________________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 55, Art. 1]

Whether Human Virtue Is a Habit?

Objection 1: It would seem that human virtue is not a habit: For
virtue is "the limit of power" (De Coelo i, text. 116). But the limit
of anything is reducible to the genus of that of which it is the
limit; as a point is reducible to the genus of line. Therefore virtue
is reducible to the genus of power, and not to the genus of ha