igible spiritual
things, on account of the natural connection of the intellect with
corporeal things, which come under the imagination. Now in corporeal
quantities, a thing is said to be great, according as it reaches the
perfection of quantity due to it; wherefore a certain quantity is
reputed great in man, which is not reputed great in an elephant. And
so also in forms, we say a thing is great because it is perfect. And
since good has the nature of perfection, therefore "in things which
are great, but not in quantity, to be greater is the same as to be
better," as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 8).
Now the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways: first, in
respect of the form itself: secondly, in respect of the participation
of the form by its subject. In so far as we consider the perfections
of a form in respect of the form itself, thus the form is said to be
"little" or "great": for instance great or little health or science.
But in so far as we consider the perfection of a form in respect of
the participation thereof by the subject, it is said to be "more" or
"less": for instance more or less white or healthy. Now this
distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form has a
being outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to
consider the form according to its specific nature, and another to
consider it in respect of its participation by a subject.
In this way, then, there were four opinions among philosophers
concerning intensity and remission of habits and forms, as Simplicius
relates in his _Commentary on the Predicaments._ For Plotinus and the
other Platonists held that qualities and habits themselves were
susceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material
and so had a certain want of definiteness, on account of the infinity
of matter. Others, on the contrary, held that qualities and habits of
themselves were not susceptible of more or less; but that the things
affected by them (_qualia_) are said to be more or less, in respect
of the participation of the subject: that, for instance, justice is
not more or less, but the just thing. Aristotle alludes to this
opinion in the _Predicaments_ (Categor. vi). The third opinion was
that of the Stoics, and lies between the two preceding opinions. For
they held that some habits are of themselves susceptible of more and
less, for instance, the arts; and that some are not, as the virtues.
The fourth opinion was held by s
|