and body.

Obj. 3: Further, habit is a disposition whereby we are well or ill
disposed in regard to something, as is said (Metaph. v, text. 25).
But that anyone should be well or ill disposed to an act of the
intellect is due to some disposition of the body: wherefore also it
is stated (De Anima ii, text. 94) that "we observe men with soft
flesh to be quick witted." Therefore the habits of knowledge are not
in the intellect, which is separate, but in some power which is the
act of some part of the body.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2, 3, 10) puts
science, wisdom and understanding, which is the habit of first
principles, in the intellective part of the soul.

_I answer that,_ concerning intellective habits there have been
various opinions. Some, supposing that there was only one _possible_
[*See First Part, Q. 79, A. 2, ad 2] intellect for all men, were
bound to hold that habits of knowledge are not in the intellect
itself, but in the interior sensitive powers. For it is manifest that
men differ in habits; and so it was impossible to put the habits of
knowledge directly in that, which, being only one, would be common to
all men. Wherefore if there were but one single "possible" intellect
of all men, the habits of science, in which men differ from one
another, could not be in the "possible" intellect as their subject,
but would be in the interior sensitive powers, which differ in
various men.

Now, in the first place, this supposition is contrary to the mind of
Aristotle. For it is manifest that the sensitive powers are rational,
not by their essence, but only by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Now
the Philosopher puts the intellectual virtues, which are wisdom,
science and understanding, in that which is rational by its essence.
Wherefore they are not in the sensitive powers, but in the intellect
itself. Moreover he says expressly (De Anima iii, text. 8, 18) that
when the "possible" intellect "is thus identified with each thing,"
that is, when it is reduced to act in respect of singulars by the
intelligible species, "then it is said to be in act, as the knower is
said to be in act; and this happens when the intellect can act of
itself," i.e. by considering: "and even then it is in potentiality in
a sense; but not in the same way as before learning and discovering."
Therefore the "possible" intellect itself is the subject of the habit
of science, by which the intellect, even though it be not actually