hether it be transitory or lasting. But in
them, we do not consider anything pertaining to the notion of good or
evil: because movements and passions have not the aspect of an end,
whereas good and evil are said in respect of an end.

On the other hand, the mode or determination of the subject, in
regard to the nature of the thing, belongs to the first species of
quality, which is habit and disposition: for the Philosopher says
(Phys. vii, text. 17), when speaking of habits of the soul and of the
body, that they are "dispositions of the perfect to the best; and by
perfect I mean that which is disposed in accordance with its nature."
And since the form itself and the nature of a thing is the end and
the cause why a thing is made (Phys. ii, text. 25), therefore in the
first species we consider both evil and good, and also
changeableness, whether easy or difficult; inasmuch as a certain
nature is the end of generation and movement. And so the Philosopher
(Metaph. v, text. 25) defines habit, a "disposition whereby someone
is disposed, well or ill"; and in _Ethic._ ii, 4, he says that by
"habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the passions."
For when the mode is suitable to the thing's nature, it has the
aspect of good: and when it is unsuitable, it has the aspect of evil.
And since nature is the first object of consideration in anything,
for this reason habit is reckoned as the first species of quality.

Reply Obj. 1: Disposition implies a certain order, as stated above
(A. 1, ad 3). Wherefore a man is not said to be disposed by some
quality except in relation to something else. And if we add "well or
ill," which belongs to the essential notion of habit, we must
consider the quality's relation to the nature, which is the end. So
in regard to shape, or heat, or cold, a man is not said to be well or
ill disposed, except by reason of a relation to the nature of a
thing, with regard to its suitability or unsuitability. Consequently
even shapes and passion-like qualities, in so far as they are
considered to be suitable or unsuitable to the nature of a thing,
belong to habits or dispositions: for shape and color, according to
their suitability to the nature of thing, concern beauty; while heat
and cold, according to their suitability to the nature of a thing,
concern health. And in this way heat and cold are put, by the
Philosopher, in the first species of quality.

Wherefore it is clear how to answer the second ob