Predicaments,_ "he
includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when he says 'as to
place,'" and this belongs to the predicament "Position," which is the
order of parts in a place: "when he says 'as to power,' he includes
all those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet
arrived at perfect usefulness," such as inchoate science and virtue:
"and when he says, 'as to species,' he includes perfect dispositions,
which are called habits," such as perfected science and virtue.
________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 49, Art. 2]

Whether Habit Is a Distinct Species of Quality?

Objection 1: It would seem that habit is not a distinct species of
quality. Because, as we have said (A. 1), habit, in so far as it is a
quality, is "a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed
well or ill." But this happens in regard to any quality: for a thing
happens to be well or ill disposed in regard also to shape, and in
like manner, in regard to heat and cold, and in regard to all such
things. Therefore habit is not a distinct species of quality.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says in the _Book of the
Predicaments_ (Categor. vi), that heat and cold are dispositions or
habits, just as sickness and health. Therefore habit or disposition
is not distinct from the other species of quality.

Obj. 3: Further, "difficult to change" is not a difference belonging
to the predicament of quality, but rather to movement or passion.
Now, no genus should be contracted to a species by a difference of
another genus; but "differences should be proper to a genus," as the
Philosopher says in _Metaph._ vii, text. 42. Therefore, since habit
is "a quality difficult to change," it seems not to be a distinct
species of quality.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says in the _Book of the
Predicaments_ (Categor. vi) that "one species of quality is habit
and disposition."

_I answer that,_ The Philosopher in the _Book of Predicaments_
(Categor. vi) reckons disposition and habit as the first species of
quality. Now Simplicius, in his _Commentary on the Predicaments,_
explains the difference of these species as follows. He says "that
some qualities are natural, and are in their subject in virtue of its
nature, and are always there: but some are adventitious, being caused
from without, and these can be lost. Now the latter," i.e. those
which are adventitious, "are habits and dispositions, differing in
the point of bein