ich injury redounds to God, inasmuch as the person injured is an
object of God's providence and protection.
Reply Obj. 2: If we are angry with those who harm others, and seek to
be avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong in
some way to us: either by some kinship or friendship, or at least
because of the nature we have in common.
Reply Obj. 3: When we take a very great interest in a thing, we look
upon it as our own good; so that if anyone despise it, it seems as
though we ourselves were despised and injured.
Reply Obj. 4: Silence provokes the insulter to anger when he thinks
it is due to contempt, as though his anger were slighted: and a
slight is an action.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 47, Art. 2]
Whether the Sole Motive of Anger Is Slight or Contempt?
Objection 1: It would seem that slight or contempt is not the sole
motive of anger. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that we
are angry "when we suffer, or think that we are suffering, an
injury." But one may suffer an injury without being despised or
slighted. Therefore a slight is not the only motive of anger.
Obj. 2: Further, desire for honor and grief for a slight belong to
the same subject. But dumb animals do not desire honor. Therefore
they are not grieved by being slighted. And yet "they are roused to
anger, when wounded," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8).
Therefore a slight is not the sole motive of anger.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2) gives many other
causes of anger, for instance, "being forgotten by others; that
others should rejoice in our misfortunes; that they should make known
our evils; being hindered from doing as we like." Therefore being
slighted is not the only motive for being angry.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that anger is
"a desire, with sorrow, for vengeance, on account of a seeming slight
done unbecomingly."
_I answer that,_ All the causes of anger are reduced to slight. For
slight is of three kinds, as stated in Rhet. ii, 2, viz. "contempt,"
"despiteful treatment," i.e. hindering one from doing one's will,
and "insolence": and all motives of anger are reduced to these three.
Two reasons may be assigned for this. First, because anger seeks
another's hurt as being a means of just vengeance: wherefore it seeks
vengeance in so far as it seems just. Now just vengeance is taken
only for that which is done unjustly; hence that w
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