ppetitive power,
which of itself regards good and evil. Moreover, it belongs to the
sensitive appetite: for it is accompanied by a certain
transmutation--i.e. contraction--as Damascene says (Cf. Obj. 1).
Again, it implies relation to evil as overcoming, so to speak, some
particular good. Wherefore it has most properly the character of
passion; less, however, than sorrow, which regards the present evil:
because fear regards future evil, which is not so strong a motive as
present evil.

Reply Obj. 1: Virtue denotes a principle of action: wherefore, in so
far as the interior movements of the appetitive faculty are
principles of external action, they are called virtues. But the
Philosopher denies that passion is a virtue by way of habit.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as the passion of a natural body is due to the
bodily presence of an agent, so is the passion of the soul due to the
agent being present to the soul, although neither corporally nor
really present: that is to say, in so far as the evil which is really
future, is present in the apprehension of the soul.

Reply Obj. 3: The senses do not apprehend the future: but from
apprehending the present, an animal is moved by natural instinct to
hope for a future good, or to fear a future evil.
________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 41, Art. 2]

Whether Fear Is a Special Passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a special passion. For
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that "the man who is not distraught
by fear, is neither harassed by desire, nor wounded by
sickness"--i.e. sorrow--"nor tossed about in transports of empty
joys." Wherefore it seems that, if fear be set aside, all the other
passions are removed. Therefore fear is not a special but a general
passion.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that "pursuit
and avoidance in the appetite are what affirmation and denial are in
the intellect." But denial is nothing special in the intellect, as
neither is affirmation, but something common to many. Therefore
neither is avoidance anything special in the appetite. But fear is
nothing but a kind of avoidance of evil. Therefore it is not a
special passion.

Obj. 3: Further, if fear were a special passion, it would be chiefly
in the irascible part. But fear is also in the concupiscible: since
the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear is a kind of sorrow";
and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that fear is "a power of
desire": an